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Surveillance is a social phenomenon that is general and commonplace, employed 
by governments, companies and communities. Its ubiquity is due to technologies 
for gathering and processing data; its strong and obvious effects raise difficult 
social questions. We give a general definition of surveillance that captures the 
notion in diverse situations and we illustrate it with some disparate examples. A 
most important, if neglected, component idea is that of the identity of the people 
or objects observed. We propose a general definition of identifiers as data 
designed to specify the identity of an entity in some context or for some purpose. 
We examine the ways identifiers depend upon other identifiers and show the 
provenance of identifiers requires reductions between identifiers and a special 
idea of personal identifier. The theory is formalised mathematically. Finally, we 
reflect on the role of formal methods to give insights in sociological contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
Surveillance is an integral part of everyday life as many technologies employed in our 
physical and virtual environments are capable of monitoring and recording. Ubiquitous 
cameras that monitor our physical environment to improve the safety and security of people 
and property are but the most visible tip of the surveillance iceberg. The invisible bulk is 
made of data and software. Our professional lives have long been conducted through software 
systems that record data about actions and events. Recently, our personal lives have become 
dependent on software systems too. There is the sociological phenomenon of the 
representation of life in data. Technologically, there is the translation and unification of all 
kinds of data into digital forms,which is combined with the transfer and unification of all 
kinds of sources of data brought about by the connectivity of computer networks. 
 
Surveillance is enormously controversial as it impacts on the multitude of notions that make 
up privacy for individuals; the conduct ofsocial and economic life of societies; and on the 
legal, political, and military foundations of the state. With this broad view, David Lyon has 
given a general description of surveillance as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to 
personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or detection” (2007: 14). 
As a general social issue, Lyon has proposed that surveillance has three main purposes: (i) 
keeping control, which is the historic purpose pursued by employers, police, government; (ii) 
social sorting, pursued by companies in marketing and managing customers; and (iii) mutual 
monitoring, pursued peer to peer in social networks, real and virtual (Lyon, 2007; our own 
italics). Of these, the methods and aims of social sorting seem to becoming universal. 
 
In this paper we examine theoretically the general idea of surveillance and one of its 
component concepts, that of identity. We seek completely abstract models that can be 
formalised and analysed mathematically. First, we develop a general definition of 
surveillance that captures the notion in diverse situations and illustrate it with some disparate 
examples. The definition shows that the three main purposes of surveillance have very similar 
structures and suggest new examples of surveillance. Our analysis applies to objects, real or 
virtual, as well as people.  
 
A most important component idea of surveillance is that of the identity of the people or 
objects observed. We introduce the general concept of identifiers, which are defined to be 
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data designed to specify the identity of an entity in some context or for some purpose. 
Identifiers are the focus of our analysis and as a starting point for our theory we propose that: 
 
Principle.  Entities are “known” only through the data that act as their identifiers. 
 
This idea seems to be valid in general, even historically; the identity of a person is reduced to 
forms of evidence including personal testimony and biometrics. In our time, the idea is 
simpler and more palatable when one considers the virtual world, since it is created and 
constantly changing. Users have many identities, which they create in a state of anonymity. 
Technically, the operations and tests on identifiers combine to make systems that are specific 
to some context or task, though with unforeseen applications. Since identifiers are data, 
clearly the systems of identifiers are what computer scientists call abstract data types. 
 
Foremost among identifiers are those that are supposed to identify people. The notion of a 
personal identifier proves to be as informative as it is subtle. To understand identity we need 
to examine the ways identifiers are issued and how they depend upon other identifiers. We 
show that the provenance of identifiers is an essential idea.  We consider principles of how 
identifiers are to be compared and when they might be deemed equivalent; this requires 
notions of reductions between identifiers.  
 
All of these ideas are motivated by informal described examples and then formalised 
mathematically using elementary algebra and logic. In their mathematical form, the 
theoretical notions are precise and reveal most clearly the possible structure of ideas. 
 
Our aim is to clarify concepts and their interdependencies from which structure emerges. Our 
formalisation can be likened to the way formal logic has long been used in philosophy to 
clarify the nature of arguments and reasoning. Formal logic has proved to a fundamental 
practical tool in the development of computer programming and software engineering. 
Whether the formal models here are useful to technologists designing surveillance systems – 
or their safeguards – remains to be seen. Finally, we reflect on the role of abstract concepts 
and formal methods to give insights in sociological contexts. 
 
2. What is Surveillance? 
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Let us begin with an abstract description of a large class of surveillance systems. 
 
Informal Definition. A surveillance system observes the behaviour of people and objects in 
space and time; it classifies behaviours into attributes; and it identifies people and objects 
with some of those attributes. A surveillance system consists of the following components 
and methods: 
1. Entity. Entities that are people or objects that possess behaviour in space and time;  
2. Observable behaviour. Methods for observing and recording behaviours;  
3. Attribute. Methods for defining and recognising attributes of behaviours, based on 
rules, norms, practices, expectations, and other observable properties; and 
4. Identity. Methods for generating data that identifies entities that exhibit the attributes 
and locate them in space and time.  
 
Although we may expect the attributes to be deviations from sets of rules, norms, practices, 
etc., the definition does not require or imply deviance. The definition does require precise 
formulations of attributes. The data that is used to identify entities are invariably numbers and 
texts, but could be sounds and images. Here are two simple examples to prepare for our 
formalisations. 
 
Example 1: Control – Motor Vehicles. Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) is a 
technology that observes vehicles and recognises number plates or registration marks, 
possibly using infrared so as to function day and night. Common applications are checking on 
vehicle speed, managing car parking and collecting tolls. The technology was functioning in 
the late 1970s; today, ANPR can be found in thousands of fixed surveillance systems owned 
by both public and private organisations. We describe some ANPR applications in terms of 
our abstract definition.  
 
The entities in such surveillance systems are cars at a particular location and time; they may 
be in transit (speed check), or entering or leaving a location (car park, congestion charge). 
The method the system uses for observing the cars is a camera that creates an image that may 
be communicated and stored. This image is processed by software that will recognise a 
behavioural attribute (e.g., breaking a speed limit) and, in particular, performs optical 
character recognition to establish the registration mark of a car. The registration mark is an 
alpha-numeric name that identifies a vehicle uniquely. On communicating this registration 
14/08/2014 
5 
 
mark, the identity of the entity is established. For example, the output of such surveillance 
systems is the identity of a vehicle travelling too fast, or arriving or leaving a particular 
location. Alternately, and in summary, a surveillance system for car parking based on an 
ANPR is:  
Entity: Cars 
Observable Behaviour: Time of arrival and departure at location  
Attributes: Duration of stay above a particular limit 
Identity: Registration marks  
 
Actually, such surveillance systems are normally thought to be observing drivers. In this case, 
we take the entities to be people. Following the ANPR stages described above, the 
registration mark is communicated to a database relevant to the application. For example, the 
database may be used to check an attribute, such as a payment (tax, charge or toll) having 
been made for that registration mark. The surveillance system knows the identity of the car, 
but not necessarily the driver. 
 
In order to find the driver an independent process involving only identity begins. The keeper 
of the vehicle must be located and contacted. Suppose the operator of the surveillance system 
communicates the registration mark with the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) 
to determine the name and address of the keeper. The output of these actions is the identity of 
the keeper – finding the actual driver may require further independent action (that is not a 
part of the surveillance system). Note that in this stage there is a transformation of identity 
data from the registration mark to the name and address of the keeper.  
 
Example 2: Social Sorting – Customer Accounts. Consider a client’s account with some 
service provider, such as a bank, insurance company or shop. Commonly, such an account 
has the following basic structure (See: Figure 2). There is a user name and password that act 
as a key simply to gain access to the account. The account details establish basic information 
such as: name, address, services provided, etc. The behaviour is the account history that not 
only records the past transactions but allows all sorts of new transactions, queries, 
preferences, etc. to be performed. It is the account history that is clearly subjected to tests that 
seek, for example, that terms and conditions are met by the client or that no unusual pattern 
of transactions has been carried out. In summary: 
Entities: Credit card accounts  
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Observable Behaviour: Transactions: date, payee, location, sum, etc.  
Attributes: Credit limit, minimum payments, unusual transactions   
Identity: Credit card number  
 
 
Figure 1: A Typical Customer Account 
 
Example 3: Mutual Monitoring – Social Media Accounts 
 
Social media connect people who have personal or professional interests in common. 
Systems such as Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and Academia.edu attract large numbers of 
users: individuals register with a system and create an account and a network of other users to 
suit their needs. Abstractly, the account has a structure similar to that of a customer account 
for a bank, insurance company or shop (see: Figure 2). The behaviour of the account is a 
history of status updates, linkages and interactions. Such social networking is firmly based on 
the fact that individuals voluntarily reveal very detailed information about themselves, their 
tastes and opinions, and their activities to their networks. From the point of view of 
surveillance, two phenomena are of interest: (i) individuals can and do ‘watch over’ the 
people in their networks, and (ii) all the data on all of the account holders belong to 
companies that can collect and use the information for commercial purposes. In summary:  
Entities: Accounts 
Observable Behaviour: Tweet 
Attributes: Keyword 
Identity: Usernames  
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Figure 2: A Typical Media Account 
 
3. A Formal Model of Surveillance 
 
We have defined surveillance as a process that observes entities seeking to detect some 
property of their behaviour and that identifies entities with the property. In this section we 
will redefine this notion of surveillance formally. We will use elementary set theory
1
 to create 
a precise and general definition that covers a great range of examples.  
 
3.1 Entities and their behaviour 
 
Entities may be people or objects, real or virtual. Let Entity be a set of entities whose 
behaviour is to be observed. Let Behaviour be the set of all possible behaviours in space and 
timeof the all the entities of Entity. The nature of behaviour and its models we will consider 
later. 
 
                                                          
1
The mathematical ideas we use are sets, functions and relations, which are described in 
many textbooks on discrete mathematics, e.g., Lipschutz and Lipson (2009), Makinson 
(2012). 
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For simplicity, we suppose that each entity eEntity has one and only one behaviour in space 
and time, i.e., its behaviour is deterministic.  In this case, there is a single-valued mapping  
[[_]]: EntityBehaviour 
such that  
[[e]] = the behaviour of the entity eEntity. 
The mapping provides a formal meaning or semantics for the behaviour of the entity. 
 
To define surveillance formally, next we have to establish what it is we are to detect. The 
purpose of surveillance is to detect some property of the behaviour of an entity – e.g., some 
action or event. Commonly, what is of interest is a deviation from the some standards of 
behaviour of the entity. To formalise the target property we simply suppose that Prop is some 
property of behaviours, i.e., 
PropBehaviour. 
The elements of Behaviour formalise the activity of the entities. The entities of interest are 
those whose behaviour lie in Prop; in symbols: 
Prop-Entity = {eEntity :[[e]]  Prop} 
 
The behaviours need to be modelled formally. How is this done? 
 
3.2. Behaviour as streams of data 
 
Typically, entities behave in time and their activities involve actions or events of some kind. 
A way to formalise behaviours is to think of a sequence of actions or events taking place in 
time. Let us show how these can be defined formally as streams, which are sequences of data 
indexed by time. 
 
Let Time be a set of time points; for example, say Time = {0, 1, 2, … , t, …}. The time points 
are data generated by a clock of some kind. 
 
Let Action be a set of actions or events characteristic of the entities. The behaviour of an 
entity is conceived of as a sequence of actions or events in time: 
a(0), a(1), a(2), . . . , a(t), . . . 
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where these a(t)Action for all tTime. Such sequences can be usefully termed traces or 
histories. 
 
Definition. A trace is an association of actions or events to time points and is formalised by a 
mapping 
a: TimeAction 
such that for all tTime 
a(t) = the action or event taking place at time tTime. 
Let Trace be the set of all possible traces.  
 
Now in many cases, the space Behaviour of all possible behaviours of the entities can be 
taken to be a subset of the set Trace of all possible traces; thus,  
Prop BehaviourTrace 
When applying the behaviour mapping [[_]] to an entity eEntity we get a trace, which is a 
map 
[[e]]: TimeAction. 
Therefore, for eEntity and tTime, we have 
[[e]](t) = the action or event of entity e taking place at time tTime. 
 
Example.  Twitter 
 
Twitter processes data called tweets. At the heart of a tweet is a simple message made from at 
most 140 characters, but a tweet is composed of much more data. For simplicity, a tweet can 
be thought of as a vector of data drawn from sets of the following kind: 
Text The text that is the status update (using UTF-8 representation for Unicode 
standard) 
Identity A string that uniquely labels the tweet 
Contributor The author(s) of the tweet. 
Time The time when this Tweet was created (measured by Coordinated Universal 
Time (UTC). 
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Location The geographic location (longitude, latitude) of this Tweet as reported by the 
user or application (using geoJSON standard). 
Retweet Status and number of retweets 
Favourite Number of favourites 
We let the set of all possible tweets be 
Tweet = TextIdentityContributorTimeLocationRetweetFavourite 
Now Twitter generates and processes streams of tweets, i.e., sequences of tweets indexed by 
time. Thus, the behaviour can be modelled by traces that are streams of tweets of the form  
a(0), a(1), a(2), … , a(t), …  Tweet, 
which is represented by a map 
a: TimeTweet. 
Let Behaviour be the set of all possible traces of these kinds. Typical user operations on 
tweets, once created, can be embedding tweets, responding to tweets, and favouring, 
unfavouring, and deleting tweets. These operations are operations on streams. 
Depending upon the circumstances, monitoring tweet feeds is called curation, filtering, or 
surveillance. Monitoring Twitter can be done in a number of ways via Application 
Programming Interfaces (APIs), which define instructions for developers to build new 
systems. Twitter’s Search API allows users to define criteria (keywords, usernames, 
locations, named places, etc) to search among existing tweets. Twitter’s Streaming API 
redirects a sample of tweets, based upon a user’s criteria, as these tweets appear. The sample 
is less than 1% (Morstatter et al., 2013). Twitter’s Firehose API delivers 100% of all publicly 
available tweets that match users’ criteria as they are made. The Twitter Firehose is complex 
and requires a subscritption. It is handled by two data providers, GNIP and DataSift. 
Twitter’s monitoring services have police tools built upon them. 
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3.3 Identifying entities 
 
The purpose of surveillance is to detect and identify entities whose behaviours lie in the 
subset Prop. Each entity eEntity has some datum that is used to attempt to identify the 
entity. We will call this datum an identifier.
2
 The association of identifiers with entities can 
become complicated as we will see in the following sections. At this stage, it is sufficient to 
suppose that identifiers have been assigned to entities 
Definition. Let Identifier be a set of possible identifiers for the entities of Entity. There is a 
relation  
id IdentifierEntity 
such that  
id(i, e) the data iIdentifier, called an identifier, is assigned to entity eE. 
Let anon be a datum that is not in the set Identifier of identifiers for the entities. 
In our general setting, the association of identifiers to entities is a relation id  
IdentifierEntity and so many identifiers can be allocated to many entities. A simple 
formulation of surveillance is to find at least one identifier for any entity whose behaviour 
satisfies Prop. This view of surveillance is embodied in the following mapping: define  
Surv(Prop): Entity Identifier {anon} 
ForeEntity by 
Surv(Prop)(e)  = (some i) id(i, e)  if  [[e]] Prop 
= anon    if  [[e]] Prop.  
 
Note that entities whose behaviours do not lie in Prop are ignored and will not be identified, 
i.e., they will remain anonymous. Combining these ideas we can define formally a very 
general notion of a surveillance system. 
                                                          
2
 In computing, the term identifier is well established and is data that names a computational 
component; invariably, it is a string that defines a component in a programming language 
such as locations, procedures, program etc.  Our use is a generalisation and is close to the 
idea of a pure name in Needham (1989). The term is in use in some discussions of identity. 
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Definition. A surveillance system for a property of entities in a context has the form  
SurvSys = (Entity, Identifier, Behaviour, Prop | id, [[_]], Sur(Prop)), 
consisting of the four non-empty sets  
Entity, Identifier, Behaviour, Prop 
and the two mappings  
[[_]]: EntityBehaviour 
Surv(Prop): EntityIdentifier {anon},  
and the relation 
Id  IdentifierEntity. 
 
The definition proposes a general logical form of a surveillance system. It is a formal 
specification that establishes precisely the essential components of the system. Users and 
designers should have these in mind before thinking of any specific technological 
implementation. Any actual surveillance system will contain many technologies. These 
technologies will suggest some new logical components that can be explored in theorising 
and formalising implementations.  
 
Design Problem. For a user and designer the essence of their cooperation is: 
1. Specification. To define the desired surveillance system:  
(Entity, Identifier, Behaviour, Prop | id, [[_]], Surv(Prop)). 
2. Implementation. To choose technologies to  
a. represent the behaviours of the entities; 
b. observe behaviours and recognise those behaviours having the property; 
c. represent the identities; 
d. recognise the identity of entities 
 
4. Surveillance and Social Sorting 
 
The formal model of surveillance we have defined can be extended to include the 
phenomenon called social sorting. Social sorting is the categorization of populations and 
results in a classification used to treat people differently. The notion is central in surveillance.  
Although formulated to understand the social impact of surveillance on people, social sorting 
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makes sense for entities of all kinds. We will formalise social sorting using more abstract 
notions of categorization and partition; we argue that it is rather problematic from a technical 
point of view because of the role of identity. 
 
4.1.Sorting entities 
 
At first sight, social sorting aims to produce a categorization of entities (especially people). 
What is a categorization? 
 
Definition. Let Entity be a set of entities. A categorization of entities is a collection of 
subsets  
S1, S2,  … ,SkEntity 
that include all the entities, i.e.,   
S1 S2   … Sk =Entity 
 
An entity e lies in at least one of the sets and possibly several. In this loose idea we may have 
categories overlapping and having interesting internal structure (e.g., they may form a 
hierarchy).  Commonly, and most simply, we may want the sets not to overlap.  
 
Definition. The classification is a partition if for 1 n,m k, we have SnSm = . 
 
4.2 Sorting identifiers 
 
However, our understanding of surveillance observes behaviours of entities – not entities – 
and recognises only identifiers for entities – not the entities themselves.  Thus, surveillance 
for sorting delivers a categorization of identifiers not entities. This makes the notion quite 
subtle. 
 
Definition.  Let Identifier be a set of identifiers. A categorization of identifiers is a collection 
of subsets  
S1, S2,  … ,SkIdentifier 
that includes all the identifiers, i.e.,   
S1 S2   … Sk  =Identifier 
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Again, an identifier i lies in at least one of the sets and possibly several. However, the 
structure must be measured against the entities that the identifiers name. Given an entity e 
there can be identifiers i and j for e that lie in different classes. This means that the 
categorization of identifiers does not lead to a categorization of entities. There are 
ambiguities that need to be studied. Ideally, our categorization of identifiers can be 
transformed into one that corresponds with the entities: 
 
Definition. The categorization respects the entities if for all i, jIdentifier,  
If iSn and i and j name the same entity then jSn 
 
Questions of ambiguity arise that can be resolved the equality of identifiers.  
 
5. What is Identity? 
 
Essential to establishing identity is the collection, storage and processing of data. Indeed, 
identity is almost purely a matter of data. People and objects are named, labelled or otherwise 
denoted by data relevant to contexts. The data in question captures some relevant aspects of a 
person or an object. Different identities are managed by different kinds of identity 
management systems. Be it physical or virtual, an identity is presented by a data type 
 
We will look at some examples of identity management systems prior to providing a working 
definition, covering birth certificate, health records, driving license and National Insurance 
(NI) number, to demonstrate that identifiers are composite objects, in the sense that they are 
built from other identifiers.  
 
Basic personal identifiers are those upon which we rely upon to distinguish a unique human 
being that is their guarantee of identity or be it to some contexts with their own level of rigor. 
 
Thus, the purpose of an identifier is to establish when entities are the same or not in the 
surveillance context. Identifiers need not reflect any aspect of the entity or have any meaning 
at all. In our conception of surveillance, entities are observed and identified. This means that 
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necessarily, surveillance systems must have methods to define the identity of entities. An 
identifier for an entity is a name that is associated to the entity and no other identity.  
 
Working Definition. An identifier for an entity is data that is associated with the entity for 
the purposes of identifying it among similar entities.  
 
For example, a name for an entity is an identifier. By a name for an entity we commonly 
mean data made from symbols. In terms of symbols, usually, numbers are added to identifiers 
in order to make an identifier unique to the entity.  
 
The relationship between entities and identifiers can be complicated. Consider these four 
situations: 
1. Many – One Associations. Different identifiers can be assigned to the same entity. 
2. One – One Associations. Different identifiers are assigned to different entities.  
3. One – Many Associations. An identifier can be assigned to more than one entity but 
an entity has only one identifier.  
4. Many – Many Associations. An identifier is assigned to more than one entity and, 
vice versa, an entity can be assigned more than one identifier. 
 
Surveillance reports identifiers that can narrow the search for entities but need not pin down 
the particular entity of interest. Thus, one-to-one associations are important because:  
 
Search Principle: If an association is many-one then given an identifier, we can search for a 
set of entities with that identifier.  
 
Uniqueness Principle: If an association is one-one then given an identifier, we can search 
for the unique entity with that identifier.  
 
The following point is obvious but certainly profoundly important practically:  
 
Enumeration Principle: The addition of a number to an identifier of an entity can turn any 
many-one association into a one-one association.   
 
We will illustrate some of these with example, to which we will return in the formal theory.  
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Example 1: Cars. This example illustrates one-one and many-one associations. Each car is 
assigned a registration mark, commonly known as registration number. The current system of 
UK was introduced on 1
st
 September 2001. In general, each registration mark consists of 
seven characters with a defined format. From left to right, the characters consist of: (i) a local 
memory tag or area code, consisting of two letters that indicates the local registration office; 
(ii) a two-digit age identifier, which changes twice a year, in March and September; and (iii) 
a three-letter sequence which uniquely distinguishes each of the cars displaying the same 
initial four-character area and age sequence. The association of registration marks to cars is 
one-one. A car has one and only one registered keeper. Thus, the association of a registration 
marks to a keeper is unique. However, a person can be a registered keeper of as many cars as 
he/she wants. Thus, the association of registration marks to keepers is many-one. 
 
The registration document (V5) for a car identifies the car and its keeper. However, it is not 
proof of ownership. The registered keeper is the person who is legally responsible for the car 
and need not to be the owner of the vehicle. Many people have insurance policies that enable 
them to drive any car with the owner’s permission. Thus, the driver of a car on a particular 
occasion may be only loosely connected to the keeper. The association of cars to drivers is 
one-many. In terms of formal documents (containing several identifiers), the association 
between registration marks and drivers is complicated and probably incomplete.  
 
Example 2: Communications. This example demonstrates both many-one and many-many 
associations. When connecting a computer to the Internet, a number is needed called an IP 
address (32 bits under IP Protocol 4) that uniquely identifies the machine in the network. In 
some computer networks, such as networks local to an organisation or company, there is an 
IP address for the machine that does not change; these are called static IP addresses. The 
association of computers to IP addresses is one-one. More commonly, at home IP addresses 
are generated by the Internet Service Provider in response to a customer’s need for Internet 
access. Thus, overtime IP addresses can change and the association of IP addresses to a 
particular computer is many-one. Developing this example, if more than one computer is 
accessing the Internet at the same time in a period, from the same service then the association 
between IP addresses and computers is many-many. The changing status seems to be natural 
in time-dependent associations of identifiers.  
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Example 3: Addresses. This example demonstrates a one-many association. In the UK a 
system of postal codes was introduced, between 1959-1974, to enable the automation of 
postal services. Typically, each address or location is assigned at most one postcode but a 
postcode can be assigned to more than one unit or building. The association between 
postcodes and buildings/addresses is one-many.  
 
Thus, postcodes are a system of identifiers that do not uniquely determine addresses. 
Postcodes have found many uses and are used routinely in commercial transactions, 
navigation, and, more significantly, in calculating insurance, designing social policy and 
funding, and academic social studies – all of which are examples of social sorting.  
 
Working Definition. An identity management system for a set of entities is a system with the 
following two properties:   
(i) Identifier Generation: the system can create and delete identifiers for entities; and  
(ii) Identifier Authentication: the system can, given two identifiers, decide whether or 
not they are associated with the same entity.  
 
Another stronger formulation of authentication, which focuses on entities and the identifiers, 
is the following: Entity Authentication: the system can, given an entity and identifier, decide 
whether or not the identifier is associated with the entity.
3
 The notion is attractive but 
problematic for what does it mean to be “given an entity”? In much theory and practice, the 
entity is actually given by means of another identifier! 
 
6. A Formal Model of Identity 
 
We now consider formally the idea of a system of identifiers for the entities under 
observation. Systems of identifiers can have many properties that require technical analysis, 
classification and application. There are three aspects arising from our discussion of 
examples: assigning identifiers, comparing identifiers and basic personal identifiers. We will 
continue to use the formal notations introduced earlier in our formal definition of surveillance 
in Section 3. 
 
                                                          
3
 Property (ii) is implied by this property.  
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6.1 Assigning Identifiers.   
 
An identifier is some datum used to identify an entity in a context.  
 
Definition. Suppose that identifiers have been assigned to entities and there is a relation  
id IdentifierEntity 
such that  
id(i, e) = the data iI, called an identifier, is assigned to entity eE. 
We define the entities named by identifier i by 
ent(i) = { eEntity | id(i, e) } 
and all the identifiers naming entity e by 
id(e) = { iIdentifier | id(i, e) }. 
These sets are projections of the relation id. 
 
These are loose associations, wherein many identifiers can be associated with entities or 
many entities can have the same identifier. Let us make this idea our most general definition. 
 
Definition. A system of identifiers is a structure consisting of two non-empty sets and a 
relation: 
IdSys = (Identifier, Entity| id IdentifierEntity). 
 
The examples suggest that the following special case is important. 
 
Example: Post Codes. Typically, each address/building is assigned at most one postcode but 
a postcode can be assigned to more than one unit or building. A one-many relations 
code: PostcodeAddress. 
 
Definition. A system of identifiers IdSys is said to satisfy the many-one property if each 
identifier is assigned to one entity but an entity may have many identifiers. In this case, the 
relation becomes a single-valued mapping  
id: Identifier Entity  
such that  
id(i) = the entity eEntity named by the data iIdentifier. 
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Since the purpose of the identifiers is to recognise the entities that we are interested in, the 
following equivalence relation on Identifier is basic: for any i1 and i2Identifier, we say they 
are id-equivalent if they are associated with the same entity: in symbols,  
i1eni2 if, and only if, id(i1) = id(i2). 
 
The identifier captures and narrows down detection of entities. Thus, we can strengthen the 
system of identifiers if we can satisfy this condition: 
 
Definition. A system of identifiers IdSys is said to satisfy the one-to-one uniqueness property 
if entities have one and only one identifier and so the identifier is unique to the entity. In this 
case the map id satisfies this property: for any i1 and i2Identifier, 
if id(i1) = id(i2)  then  i1 = i2. 
The map id is one-to-one or injective. 
 
Example: Cars. Each car is assigned a registration mark, commonly known as registration 
number. The association of registration marks to cars is one-one. 
 
6.2 Generating identifiers 
 
How is an identifier generated for an entity in an identity management system? A few general 
ideas can be formulated. First, some input data is presented to the system that has to be 
examined and approved. 
 
Definition. The data presented to a system to create an identifier is a specification of the 
entity. We will call this data a form and we let Form be the set of all possible forms for the 
system. 
 
We represent the processing of the form by a function 
Check: Forms  {0, 1} 
that tests the data in a form f  Form for consistency against the system’s rules. We assume 
that check(f) = 1 means the form is accepted and check(f) = 0 means the form is rejected. 
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We represent the next stage – if and when an identifier is issued – by a function  
issue: Forms  Identifier 
which uses some or all of the data in f  Form to make an identifier. 
 
These stages are represented by composing the functions to make 
generate: Forms  Identifier 
where 
generate(f) = if check(f)=1 then issue (f) else reject 
 
7. Personal Identity  
 
Of greatest interest are surveillance systems in which the entities are people. A fundamental 
problem is how identifiers can actually identify a specific individual. We consider some 
examples of assigning data to individuals. 
 
7.1 Examples 
 
Example 1: Biometrics 
Biometric identifiers are measurable qualities that can be used to describe and label the 
physical characteristics of individuals. Physiological characteristics are related to the body, 
and include fingerprints, photographs, palm prints, hand geometries, iris and retina images, 
odour/scent, and DNA. Behavioural characteristics are related to the behaviour of a person, 
including typing rhythm, gait and voice. The association of a biometric to people is expected 
to be one-one.  
The operational tests used to measure biometrics, such as DNA, fingerprint and iris, are of 
course, approximate, due to technological constraints. Thus, that data presented manifests a 
one-one identity association is a matter of probability, especially high probability. Current 
studies suggest that increasingly accurate measurements can reveal differences in DNA 
between twins. Thus, although identical twins share very similar DNA, they are not identical 
(O’Connor, 2008). Identity is the subject of genetic research.  Recently, public attention was 
drawn to this point when identical twins are identified by DNA evidence as suspects in a 
series of sexual assaults, in Marseille, France, and soon after in Reading, England. News 
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reporting of the incidents is somewhat confused and incomplete. In the case of Marseille, it 
was reported that officials may have to pay about $1.3 million to compare billions pairs of 
nucleotides that make up DNA rather than compare 400 base pairs in a normal analysis 
(BBC, 2013). In the case of Reading, a commercial breakthrough in forensics was reported 
(Knapton, 2013). 
Example 2: Citizenship 
 
In the UK, for example, an individual can or must register with state organisations devoted to 
for health, employment, passport, and transport. Everyone registered with the National Health 
Service has his/her unique number, which is linked to his/her health record; each NHS 
number is made up of 10 alpha-numerics.  Everyone gets a National Insurance (NI) number 
just before he/she turns 16. An individual’s NI number makes sure his/her NI contributions 
and taxes are only recorded against her/her name. The format of the number is two prefix 
letters, six digits, and one suffix letter. In the new style red passport book, in addition to the 
biometrics, there is a passport number that must be nine characters and all characters must be 
numeric. Finally, each driving licence has a number made up of 18 alpha-numerics, which 
codes part or all of (i) the surname; (ii) the date of birth; (iii) the first names; (iv) sex; (v) 
licence issue; (vi) checks. In these cases of registration, numbers are added to identifiers in 
order to ensure each of these associations one-one. 
 
7.2 Formal Person Identifiers.  
 
A person identifier is data, but very special data. We wrote extensively about person 
identifiers earlier, citing the fundamental role of passports, National Insurance numbers, 
National Health Service numbers, and for some categories of people national identity cards.  
 
We have emphasised how systems of identity are designed for certain purposes and that they 
are established with widely varying standards of rigour and are combined and compared in all 
sorts of ways. The fundamental person identifiers above carry weight: on the authority of the 
state identifying people and their basic situations for citizenship, employment, tax, and 
health.  
 
Definition. A personal identity system has the form  
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PIdSys = (Identifier, Person | pid: Identifier Person). 
and satisfies the uniqueness property, namely two different people are assigned different 
data.  
 
In practice, the data assigned to a person invariably includes a number or alpha-numeric code 
precisely in order to enforce the uniqueness property. 
 
The role of all systems of identity is understood by studying comparisons that involve 
reductions, but this is especially true of personal identity systems.   
 
8. Provenance of Identifiers 
 
8.1 Generating identifiers using other identifiers 
 
Creating identifiers is an everyday occurrence; we open accounts, register for services, apply 
for permissions, buy products, etc. For many of these actions, we rely on a handful of pre-
existing identifiers. To open a bank account, we give a proof of our identity and our current 
address, e.g., using a passport and a recent utility bill. To buy a product, an address and a 
credit card account number are usually sufficient for the vendor: notice the dependency on 
the bank identifier. At face value, the quality of a bank identifier is guaranteed by the 
databases of the state (passport, driver’s licence) and, say, an energy provider (utility bill). 
The passport provides a high quality identifier based on a birth certificate, a photograph and 
possibly other biometric data. Example by example, illustrates the general point that: 
 
Principle. New identifiers are created from pre-existing identifiers.  
 
The dependability of one identifier upon another may be illustrated in an identity tree (see: 
Figure 3). The identifiers that appear in the nodes of the tree can create quite complicated 
dependency networks of identifiers.  
 
The quality of an identifier is essentially a matter of its reliability, which in turn depends on 
its provenance, i.e., the process involved in establishing the identifier. In the case of people, a 
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passport is a standard example of a high quality identifier with a rigorous provenance. In the 
case of a bank, the process is weaker as it is a now routine act of checking on identity. 
 
Since identifiers are often built from other identifiers, of central importance is the process of 
comparing identifiers and reducing one type of identifier to another. Recognising a number 
plate of a car behaving badly can lead to a letter arriving at the address of the keeper and 
involves the transformation of a number of high quality identifiers (e.g., registration mark, 
keeper’s name, address and driving history). All of these observations and ideas are 
formalised to make a precise and general mathematical framework for analysing identifiers.  
 
In Figure 3 below, establishing the identifier ID1 involves providing evidence in the form of 
other identifiers: ID2-ID6. Thus, the validity of ID1 depends upon, or is reduced to, the 
validities of ID2-ID6. Some of these identifiers have a special status, in that they are designed 
to reliably denote an individual. In the example, these personal identifiers are guaranteed by 
the state (ID4) and biometric data (ID3); in the latter case, ID6 is used to allow a passport to 
be issued by post, without face-to-face interaction.     
 
8.2. Generating identifiers from identifiers 
 
Now suppose that an identifier is generated for an entity in an identity management system. 
The few general ideas of Section 6.2 can be reformulated. Again, some input data is 
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presented to the system that has to be examined and approved, but this time other identifiers 
must also be presented. 
 
We represent the processing of the form by a function with new variables: 
Check: FormsIdentifier1  … Identifierk {0, 1} 
that tests the data in a form fForm and the information available from identifiers i1, … , ik 
for consistency against the system’s rules. As usual, we assume that check(f, i1, … , ik) = 0 
means the form is rejected and check(f, i1, … , ik) = 1 means the form is accepted. 
 
Let us assume the following: 
 
Provenance Principle. The data in f  Form is sufficient to create an identifier and that the 
data in the identifiersi1, … ,ik are used only to validate the data inf. 
4
 
 
Then we can represent the next stage by the same function  
issue: Forms Identifier. 
These two stages are represented by composing the functions to make 
generate: Forms Identifier1  … Identifierk Identifier 
where 
generate(f, i1, … , ik) = if check(f, i1, … , ik)=1 then issue (f) else reject 
 
9. Comparing identifiers 
 
Consider the case where a set Entity of entities has two systems of identifiers: 
IdSys1 = (Entity, Identifier1, id1: Identifier1Entity), 
IdSys2 = (Entity, Identifier2, id2: Identifier2Entity). 
How can we relate or compare these systems?  
 
One simple case is when the identifiers in Identifier1 can be associated or matched with one 
or more identifiers in Identifier2. This means that given an identifier iIdentifier1 of an entity 
                                                          
4
 It is easy to represent the case where the identifiers add information to that in the form: the 
function would have the form issue (f,i1, … ,ik). 
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eEntity, we can find some corresponding identifier in Identifier2 that is also an identifier for 
e. This is formalised as follows: 
 
Definition. The system of identifiers IdSys1 is said to reduce to the system of identifiers 
IdSys2 if there is a single-valued mapping 
red: Identifier1  Identifier2 
that calculates for each identifier in Identifier1 a corresponding identifier in Identifier2 for 
entities in the following precise sense: for every entity i Identifier1, 
id1(i) = id2(red(i)) 
 
 
Example. Consider the set Keep of keepers of vehicles in the UK and two systems of identity 
for this set of entities. Suppose, for simplicity, each keeper has one car. Each car has a 
registration mark. Let the first system be 
Reg = (Keep, Regmk | reg: RegmkKeep). 
Every keeper has an address assigned by the postal service so let 
Add = (Keep, Address | addr: AddressKeep). 
Then the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency (DVLA) is responsible for the determining 
the keeper’s address from the registration mark, which is defined formally by the reduction 
map red: RegmkAddress such that for every registration mark r Regmk, 
reg(r) = addr(red(r)). 
We say that the system of identities Reg is reducible to Add. 
 
10. Conclusion  
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We have used formal methods to model precisely the main conceptual components involved 
in surveillance. To isolate and define ideas in great generality is the raison d’être of formal 
methods, though their mathematical nature presents obstacles to their reception and 
appreciation.  
 
Our analysis of surveillance and identity has focused on technologies that collect and process 
data. At the heart of such technologies are software systems, which by their nature are 
examples of formalised systems. In surveillance, we study the representation of various forms 
of data (visual, audio and textual) and computation and communication with these data. Thus, 
the conceptual modelling of such systems is naturally and necessarily and ultimately a matter 
for mathematical formalisation. The formal framework we offer is both a rigorous analysis of 
the conceptual structure of surveillance and a starting point for technical questions about 
software.  
 
Let us observe that increasingly our professional and social interaction is carried out – or 
controlled – by abstract technological systems rather than by direct face-to-face interactions. 
Whilst interacting with each of these systems, an individual needs to give over some of 
his/her identity to distinguish himself/herself from other users. Thus, rather than having a 
single and holistic identity, individuals now have many separated and overlapping identities. 
The multiplicity of identity, especially the extension of identity from the physical to the 
virtual world, requires the nature of identity needs to be problematised. 
 
In the new era, the physical and the virtual are converging. In particular, the physical world is 
being sucked into the virtual, causing muddle and confusion. We have only recently begun to 
create a virtual world that is independent and shows signs of autonomy. Clearly, the physical 
and the virtual are fundamentally different and we must negotiate their co-existence. With 
this prospect, all the components and methods of surveillance – entity, observable behaviour, 
attribute and identity – will exist more definitively and naturally in their virtual forms, which 
are those of data and software. Thus, in practice, surveillance will increasingly become 
dominated by methods for the production, communication and publication of data and their 
scientific, social and political consequences.  
 
Finally, let us observe that whenever a social science topic – in this case surveillance – is 
closely associated with technology – especially with technological tools that collect and 
14/08/2014 
27 
 
process data effectively – then the specification of the software tools, i.e., what they do for 
users, can be formalised in much the same way as we have approached the problem here. 
Thus, the sociological notions that motivate, shape and are ultimately represented in the 
specification of software can be defined in a formal framework which can be mathematically 
analysed. In short,  
 
Principle. Sociological topics that are closely associated with software techniques can be 
expected to have formal theories. 
 
The use of formal methods to express and analyse general notions is a commonplace in areas 
of philosophy and linguistics but seems to be rare in social studies given the invasion of 
software into professional and social life, and the chain reaction on data, the role of formal 
methods to theorise about social concepts and problems is destined to grow. 
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